Abstract: An approach for the analysis and management of multiple criteria critical infrastructure problems is put forth. Nuclear waste management involves complex tradeoffs under uncertainty. Among all waste either generated by nature or human activities, radioactive nuclear waste is the most toxic to human health and difficult to manage: it is known that some nuclear waste material will be radioactive and potentially dangerous for hundreds of thousands of years. This paper discusses the use of multiple criteria decision analysis techniques such as the analytic hierarchy process for recommending sites to be considered as potential repositories for nuclear waste.
Introduction
The issue of radioactive waste storage is critical to the sustainability of the biosphere. In the UK alone, approximately half a million ton of radioactive waste will exist when nuclear material currently in use is converted into solid waste. Radioactive nuclear waste is highly complex and dangerous to human health: radioactive material is capable of contaminating large areas of land, water and air. There are two main forms of uranium that are surplus to the requirements of nuclear energy production: depleted uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride tailings (a by-product of fuel fabrication and enrichment) and depleted reprocessed uranium (derived from reprocessing of irradiated fuel). During the generation of nuclear power, radioactive waste is produced in various forms with different physical and chemical characteristics (e.g., concentrations and half-lives of the radionuclides): in gaseous form (e.g., ventilation exhausts from facilities handling radioactive materials), in liquid form (e.g., high-level liquid waste from reprocessing of spent fuel) and in solid form (e.g., vitrified reprocessing waste). In addition, there are radioactive materials, such as plutonium and spent nuclear fuel, which are not currently classified as waste in many countries because of the potential value derived from reprocessing. In the future, if these materials have no further use, they must also be included as part of a waste management strategy.
The main options for the long-term management of radioactive waste include above ground storage, underground disposal, underground storage and partitioning and transmutation. Options that have been largely rejected include disposal at sea and in the sub-seabed (environmental protection concerns), outer space (large number of rocket launches would be needed, the potential of a launch failure exists and there are concerns about large-scale pollution). Other waste disposal options that have been rejected include subduction zones (due to the uncertain fate of the wastes) and ice sheets (disposal in Antarctica is ruled out due to environmental treaties). In the UK, in the absence of a final management policy, intermediate-level wastes (ILW) and high-level wastes (HLW) are stored above ground. Permanent surface storage places a radioactive waste burden on future generations and current storage systems (structures and packages) and enforcement regimes may need to be redesigned: even with strict storage regulations, waste material can be misplaced. For example, two pieces of a radioactive fuel rod from the Yankee Vermont nuclear reactor in the USA are currently unaccounted for. The material would be fatal to anyone who came in contact with it without being properly shielded. This is not an isolated incident: in 2002, a Connecticut nuclear plant was fined after spent nuclear fuel could not be accounted for. In the wrong hands, this material could be used for the construction of the so-called 'dirty bombs' that are able to spread deadly radiation with conventional explosives.
A report by the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) concluded that a sealed deep underground geologic disposal facility for ILW and HLW is the preferred option in most member countries (OECD, 1999) . While the properties of certain rock formations have remained unchanged over geological periods of time (enabling the isolation of radioactive material for one million years), underground disposal would preclude the possibility of future generations utilising future technologic advances. Clearly, no one can predict the physical events and scientific findings that will impact radioactive risk management options over hundreds of thousands of years: in the long-term, technologic advances hold out possibilities for cancer cures and genome mapping that may one day affect society's perception of radioactive risk management.
In the USA, there is over 50,000 tons of spent fuel from the nation's nuclear plans stored at over 100 interim locations in 39 states within 75 miles of 161 million people. To manage this waste, the Bush administration plans to proceed with a massive underground nuclear waste site beneath the Yucca Mountain in Nevada (about 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas). However, in July 2004, the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia determined that the current US administration wrongly ignored a recommendation from the National Academy of Sciences to protect humans and the environment from radioactive releases for well beyond 10,000 years. Specifically, the federal court ruling found that such leaks could peak in 300,000 years and that the administration must assure safeguards on that scale. Proponents of the underground storage depot, such as Republican Sen. Pete Domenici of New Mexico, argue that assuring safety over such long-time intervals is not realistic, while project critics argue that the federal ruling should permanently derail construction. Despite the federal ruling, Deputy Energy Secretary Kyle McSlarrow recently informed a Senate Energy Committee hearing on nuclear energy that the licence application submittal for the repository is scheduled for December 2004 and that waste acceptance is planned for 2010. Given the importance and controversy surrounding this project, it is of value to study the classic UK radioactive waste disposal selection problem, which is discussed in the next section.
Determining which nuclear waste management alternative to pursue and the specific waste repository location to select, requires the involvement of multiple stakeholders, including environmental interests, industry experts and local stakeholders. These parties will have a variety of interests and positions. Accordingly, negotiation is an important process for resolving conflicts related to nuclear waste management problems in specific and its critical infrastructure systems more generally. Moreover, in the last four decades, negotiation has emerged as a topic of study in its own right. The need to negotiate often arises in critical infrastructure projects when mutually desired resources are insufficient to satisfy all parties or when there is disagreement on relative priorities among issues. Negotiation is particularly relevant in the resolution of nuclear infrastructure conflicts, because it is often not possible or desirable for an individual to act unilaterally.
Recent attention has focused on the use of multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) methods for negotiation research (Section 2). The MCDA consists of a set of tools to help systematically compare, select, or rank a set of alternatives according to two or more criteria. Like negotiation theory, MCDA is also approximately four decades old. The focus of MCDA is usually on a single decision maker who unilaterally chooses between alternatives whose outcomes (which can be either deterministic or uncertain) differ on two or more objectives (also referred to synonymously as 'criteria,' or 'attributes'). Until the 1980s, decision-making methods focused primarily on single objective models (usually considering only profit or cost). However, practical nuclear infrastructure decisions are inherently multi-dimensional and there are significant gains to be achieved from modelling social, economic and environmental objectives simultaneously in an inclusive and iterative multiple objective planning and management process. Specifically, the use of MCDA for the selection of nuclear waste repositories in the UK is discussed (Section 3). Next three groups of MCDA methods are discussed in the context of this nuclear selection case study: the analytic hierarchy process, AHP, (Section 4), methods of joint tangency (Section 5) and the method of improving directions (Section 6). Finally, we conclude by discussing the role of MCDA in helping a decision maker think carefully about his or her values concerning the objectives, quantifying those priorities if possible and applying them to the decision or negotiation problem at hand (Section 7).
MCDA for negotiation and selection
Since MCDA is a social and managerial task, one must consider both facts and values. For instance, assessing the impact of a radiation disaster on a community and its surrounding ecosystem raises the following questions: Are all species equally important? What about the tradeoff between social factors (such as employment for local workers) and environmental factors (e.g., water quality)? Moreover, intangible attributes are extremely difficult to model. Finally, one must consider the impact of new technologies and the time value of money (including discounting and intra/inter-generational equity). There are hundreds of MCDA approaches in the literature, including the use of utility functions, which capture a party's willingness to accept risks. Utility theory belongs to the so-called 'American School' of MCDM, which is characterised by axiomatically defined utility functions and elicitation methods that are consistent with a set of assumptions about the preference structure of the decision makers.
This contrasts to the 'European School' of MCDM such as PROMETHEE and ELECTRE (which stands for ELimination Et Choix Traduisant la Realité), which employ pair-wise comparisons. The latter approach compares two policies at a time and selects one over the other if one alternative is better in most criteria and not unacceptably worse in the remaining criteria. A third group of MCDM valuation approaches, goal programming, measures how close different alternatives come to numerically defined goals. Although it is usually applied to mathematical programming problems, it can also be used to rank discrete alternatives. A fourth group of MCDM methods, regret-based approaches, selects alternatives whose worst performance (across scenarios, relative to other alternatives) is better than the worst performance of other alternatives. Stochastic dominance constitutes the fifth group of MCDM methods. While stochastic dominance may be unable to produce complete alternative rankings, it can eliminate infeasible options (those that could never be selected over other options, regardless of the party's risk attitude).
Negotiation (joint decision making) involves communication between two or more individuals or groups who are trying to forge an agreement for mutual benefit. Game theory alone may not be sufficient for negotiators. Game theorists typically seek equilibrium outcomes that would result from strategic interactions of fully rational players with complete knowledge of the rules of the game. However, in actual negotiation situations, several plausible equilibriums or solutions may exist, with no a priori obvious way to choose among them. Also, one or more assumptions of game theory, such as rationality, may be violated. It may also be difficult to assign utility functions for all players, or to anticipate what moves or outcomes are possible. While game theoretic models address these problems by relaxing assumptions of strict strategic sophistication (e.g., fully rational players cognisant of all the rules of the game), game theory has often failed to provide prescriptive theory and useful advice for negotiators.
Negotiation and site selection of a nuclear repository
Radioactive nuclear waste is capable of contaminating large areas of land, water and air: for every kilogram of nuclear fuel used, roughly 10 grams of plutonium and 1 gram of actinide elements are produced. Both substances emit ionising radiation that constitutes a health hazard and in the hands of terrorists, spent nuclear fuel constitutes a national security threat. Short-term effects of exposure to ionising radiation include radiation sickness; long-term effects of chronic exposure include cancer, reproductive failure, birth defects, genetic defects and death. Also, it is known that nuclear waste material will remain radioactive and potentially dangerous for hundreds of thousands of years, thereby affecting the options of future generations. While advances in science and technology hold out the possibility of cancer cures and genome mapping that may one day affect society's perception of radioactive waste, it is not possible to predict physical and political events over the next few hundred thousand years. In addition, there are radioactive materials -such as plutonium, or spent nuclear fuel -that are not currently classified as waste in many countries (because of the potential value derived from reprocessing, etc.). In the future, if these materials have no further use, they must also be included as part of a waste management strategy.
Nirex site selection background
Nirex was established in the UK to build and operate an underground repository for radioactive waste. Nirex initially screened over 500 possible sites in the late 1980s and reduced the list to 13 possible sites. In 1988, Nirex approached professors at the Decision Analysis Unit, London School of Economics, to carry out a detailed MCDA to reduce the 12 potential sites to a handful that could be recommended to the Nirex board. The UK government policy for radioactive waste disposal is that economic and social factors, along with safety and technical matters, must be taken into account when siting a radioactive waste repository. To ensure that no key criteria were omitted, all stakeholders were identified, including Nirex board members, local authorities, European neighbours and national environmental groups.
The highest-level objectives were determined to be minimising costs, ensuring site robustness (in the sense that the expected performance of a site would be relatively predictable in the face of uncertainties), maintaining a high level of safety and minimising impact on the environment. Each of these criteria was subsequently decomposed into lower-level objectives and finally into performance criteria. In total, 30 performance criteria were included in the model, as shown in Table 1 (four 'Cost' criteria and nine 'Robustness' criteria) and Table 2 (eight 'Safety' criteria, nine 'Environment' criteria). Note that the units of the performance criteria and their range are also provided in Tables 1 and 2 . Source: Phillips (1995) .
The data of Table 3 has been converted into the preference scores (between 0 and 100) of Table 4 . A simple additive (weighted sum) MCDA model was determined to be appropriate; such a model is compensatory: losses on one attribute are compensated by gains on another (e.g., in deciding which repository to select, some environmental quality might be given up for a lower cost). Specifically, letting s ij represent the preference score of option i on attribute j, then the overall score S i for option i is given by:
where w j represents the weight associated with attribute j. Recall that there were 30 attributes in total. To illustrate, consider the process of determining the overall cost criteria score for site 1 (it is shown to be 0.082145 in Table 4 ). The first step is to consider the cost criteria for site 1 in Source: Phillips (1995) . Accordingly, a weighted sum value of 59 (rounded to the nearest integer) is found in Table 5 Table 4 . This normalisation process preserves the relative attribute weights and ensures that the final overall result produces scores on a 0-1 scale. This weighted sum (averaging) process is repeated up through the hierarchy until a single overall score was obtained for each site. • represents a score of 100.
WS represents weighted sum to the nearest integer.
AHP for negotiation and selection: Nirex CASE Study
Next, we modified the analysis of Phillips (1995) by employing the AHP method of Saaty (1992) to calculate the high-level criteria weights (cost, robustness, safety and the environment) based on a variety of perspectives: the local perspective (Table 6 ), the national environmental perspective (Table 7 ) and the economic perspective (Table 8) . Saaty (1992) also discusses the role of AHP in nuclear waste disposal problems. The AHP is a decision-making model consisting of three parts: creating a hierarchical structure of the problem; evaluating local weights by pair-wise comparison and evaluating the global weights. Firstly, the AHP breaks down the overall objective into a hierarchy of goals, where lower levels become not only more detailed and measurable, but also more conflicting, especially if each criterion represents the interests of a specific group. For example, removing a nuclear power plant may reduce ecological damage while laying off workers and increasing energy costs. Thus, it is rare to find an action that is best according to all criteria and one must search for a compromise solution (rather than an optimal one) that appropriately reconciles the various criteria. The degree to which the objectives are achieved is measured through a set of performance indicators.
The next step in the AHP example is to estimate the set of weights. Consider the four high-level weights in the Nirex case study shown in Tables 7-9 : cost (C), robustness (R), safety (S) and the environment (E). The fundamental input to the AHP is the decision maker's answers to a series of questions of the general form, 'How important is criterion A relative to criterion B?' These are termed pair-wise comparisons. Questions of this type may be used to establish, within AHP, both weights for criteria and performance scores for options on the different criteria. In order to derive the weights, the decision maker responds to pair-wise comparison questions by asking the relative importance of the two. Responses are gathered in verbal form and subsequently codified on a nine-point intensity scale, as follows, where 2, 4, 6 and 8 are intermediate values that can be used to represent shades of judgement between the five basic assessments. Table 6 AHP intensity scale
How important is A relative to B? Preference index assigned

Equally important 1
Moderately more important 3
Strongly more important 5
Very strongly more important 7
Overwhelmingly more important 9
If the judgement is that B is more important than A, then the reciprocal of the relevant index value is assigned. For example, if B is felt to be very strongly more important as a criterion for the decision than A, then the value 1/7 would be assigned to A relative to B. Because the decision maker is assumed to be consistent in making judgements about any one pair of criteria and since all criteria will always rank equally when compared to themselves, it is only ever necessary to make n(n -1)/2 comparisons to establish the full set of pair-wise judgements for n criteria. Note that while there is complete consistency in the (reciprocal) judgements made about any one pair, consistency of judgements between pairs is not guaranteed. Thus, the task is to search for the four weights that will provide the best fit to the 'observations' recorded in the pair-wise comparison matrix. This may be done in a number of ways. Saaty's basic method to identify the value of the weights calculates the elements in the eigenvector associated with the maximum eigenvalue of the matrix. Table 7 Local perspective C R S E Weights C 1 1 1/9 1/9 0.052600 R 1 1 1/7 1/7 0.059700 S 9 7 1 1 0.443900 E 9 7 1 1 0.443900 
Group decision making in the AHP
Group decision making is also widely employed using the AHP. In the group situation, each participant generates one's own pair-wise comparison matrix for each node of the hierarchy (excluding the bottom-level nodes). As pointed out by Aczel and Saaty (1983) , the same pair-wise comparison for each person can be aggregated into a group comparison by taking the geometric mean of all comparisons. The geometric mean is the only averaging process that maintains the reciprocal relationship (a ij = 1/a ij ) in the group matrix. The geometric mean of the group response can be calculated as follows:
where a ij is each person's paired comparison, r is the number of respondents, and p c is the importance priority for the person's paired comparison, where p c lies between 0 and 1, and the sum of p c equals to 1. When all group members have equal importance, p c is equal to 1/r. For the Nirex case study, the group scores were determined by taking geometric means of the results from the local, environmental and economic matrices, as shown in Table 10 . Based on our analysis, site 6 is the preferred site from the environmental and group perspective, whereas Sellafield (site 10) fares best from an economic point of view and Offshore West Deep (site 12) has the highest score from the local perspective. This is shown in Table 11 . 
Methods of joint tangency and the Nirex case study
The MCDA methods for identifying compromises using implicit value functions are also valuable. For example, Raiffa (1982) presents the methods of joint tangency. Raiffa presents the situation depicted in Figure 1 , which is assumed to depict environmental decision makers and business interests in the Nirex site selection case study. These two parties are diametrically opposed on the issues of investment cost and radiation standards.
(This discussion extends naturally to more than two issues.) An example path of negotiated intermediate agreements PW leading to the contract curve of optimal agreements SQRT is shown in Figure 1 . There are a variety of costs associated with radioactive waste disposal. Commonly considered costs include repository capital and operation costs and the costs of transporting radioactive waste. Radiation protection standards are commonly measured in the sievert (Sv) unit. One J/kg of beta or gamma radiation has one Sv of biological effect, one J/kg of alpha particles has 20 Sv effect and one J/kg of neutrons is equivalent to around 10 Sv (depending on their energy). Total dose is also commonly measured in millisieverts (mSv), one thousandth of a sievert, or microsieverts (µSv), one millionth of a sievert. The rate of dose is measured in milli-or micro-sieverts per hour or year. For instance, the natural dose is around 2 mSv/yr and maximum annual dose allowed for a nuclear industry employee in many countries (such as Australia, a major uranium exporting nation) is currently 20 mSv/year. Much higher levels of exposure can be harmful to human health: with gamma radiation a short-term dose of 1 Sv causes (temporary) radiation sickness while the 28 radiation fatalities at Chernobyl appear to have received more than 5 Sv in a few days. Decision maker 1 in Figure 1 represents the safety-conscious environmentalist in the Nirex case study, who prefers to move in a north-easterly direction to ensure more investment in the waste disposal repository and higher radiation standards for workers. Party 2 may represent an investor who prefers to go in a south-westerly direction in order to pay less and have less stringent radiation standards. Suppose the point P represented an initial position. Then, the iso-value lines indicate that there is a lens-shaped region PQURP that would represent mutual gains for both parties (An iso-value line is a locus of alternatives having equal value or desirability to one party; such points would have equal values of the party's MCDM value function.). Figure 1 also shows the points where the parties' iso-value curves are tangent to each other. These points of tangency are also points of joint efficiency and trace out the contract curve SQRT. A facilitator may help reach a tentative agreement by suggesting that the decision makers seek an improvement on P at some higher level of radiation protection -say at 27.5 mSv/year rather than at 32.5 mSv/year. The negotiators now try to seek a cost figure such that a contract of x million dollars is preferred by each party to a contract of US$ 5 million dollars (pl. query) and 32.5 mSv/year. Then, the zone of joint improvement is as depicted in Figure 2 , and the case now becomes a simpler one of distributive bargaining.
Figure 2 Zone of joint improvement between two parties
Source: Adapted from (Raiffa, 1982) .
Party 1 desires higher repository costs and might be unwilling to go below, say US$ 4.6 million, which would then be called her reservation price. If she cannot do at least as well on the price, she would rather stay at P. Meanwhile, party 2 would prefer lower x values with a reservation price (upper bound) of, say, US$ 4.8 million. Finally, since each party might be either unsure of the reservation price, or reluctant to disclose it, many innovative procedures have been proposed. For example, each decision maker may wish to simultaneously submit sealed offers to an intervener, with party 1 indicating the minimum spending on repository operation costs that she would accept, and party 2 the maximum. If the offers are compatible (party 1's offer not higher than party 2's), they could split the difference evenly and move from P to the new point -and successively, step-by-step towards the contract curve, as shown by the example path PW in Figure 1 .
Methods of improving directions
An approach proposed by Ehtamo et al. (1999) , the method of improving directions, also emphasises mathematical description of tradeoffs. While this approach uses the same geometric approach as the constraint proposal methods, one searches for a preferred point lying on the contract curve by proceeding along a direction that produces Pareto improvements with each iteration (In a Pareto improvement, no party is made worse off and one is strictly better off). As illustrated in Figure 3 , artificial budget constraints are presented to the decision makers, who then choose their most preferred points within budget. Figure 3 can be assumed to illustrate the preferences of an environmental decision maker in the Nirex case study: she prefers to move in a north-easterly direction; whereas decision maker 2, an industry representative, prefers to move in a south-westerly direction. As the budget constraints are relaxed for each party, the successive choices identify respective preference paths, constraining the contract curve to lie somewhere in the enclosed envelope. This can be seen because, given a hypothetical location on the budget constraint outside the envelope, both parties will desire to move along the constraint towards the envelope. A heuristic rule is used to adjust the slopes of the budget constraints in such a way that the preference points of the two parties coincide, yielding an approximation to the contract curve. Ehtamo et al. (1999) propose another improving-directions procedure, which is more flexible in that it does not require the decision makers to be diametrically opposed over the issues. In addition, it is not heuristic and thus admits convergence analysis. In this procedure, a mediator first proposes several possible improving directions originating, say, from the point x  as depicted in Figure 4 . Each decision maker then simply chooses the directions they individually find most preferable, a set denoted D(x). Finally, based on a rule that considers fairness issues, the mediator chooses from among the directions that provide joint improvements and advances the decision makers in that direction. Figure 4 illustrates that in the two-player case, such a fair direction T*(x) is chosen to bisect the cone of jointly improving directions D(x) as determined by the gradients of the parties' value functions " v(x). Deterministic value function methods provide a ranking of the alternatives (from best to worst) and implicitly assume that one can characterise the consequences of each alternative with certainty or that only their expected value matters. The additive value function is an example of a value model, which uses single attribute value functions v i (x ij ) and weights to obtain an overall 'value' for each alternative. The improving directions' approach of obtaining gradient information, ", about the value function is less demanding than obtaining decision makers' entire value functions at the outset. The process continues until efficiency is obtained (joint gains can no longer be realised). The improving directions' method can be extended to more than two players, in which the bisection approach of Figure 4 generalises to a maximisation problem over the improving directions D(x).
Conclusions
Nuclear waste management involves complex tradeoffs under uncertainty. Among all waste either generated by nature or human activities, radioactive nuclear waste is the most toxic to human health and difficult to manage: it is known that some nuclear waste material will be radioactive and potentially dangerous for hundreds of thousands of years. This paper discussed the use of multiple criteria decision analysis techniques such as the analytic hierarchy process for recommending sites to be considered as potential repositories for nuclear waste. Keeney and Raiffa (1976) provide more details about discrete MCDA under situations of certainty and uncertainty. Hobbs and Meier (2000) provide more detail on the use of MCDA for energy problems.
